April 25, 2026
Dot‑dot drama
How Hard Is It to Open a File?
Developers spar over whether “just open it” is safe or a hacker trap
TLDR: The post says: don’t hand privileged tools file paths—use stable file handles to block sneaky path swaps. Comments split between “you’re overreacting, use standard protections” and “this is how sandboxes like Flatpak got busted,” with extra worry that AI agents could fall for the same tricks.
A simple question—“How hard is it to open a file?”—turned into a full‑blown drama thread. The post argues that filenames can lie, attackers can swap paths mid‑click, and the only safe move for privileged tools is to use a stable “handle” to the file, not the file’s name. Think of it as holding a numbered ticket rather than trusting a scribbled note. Cue the comments. One camp shrugged: don’t overthink it. As TZubiri put it, fix the actual bug and lean on standard protections like SELinux (a system safety policy) and plain old user accounts. Others fired back with receipts: this is how a Flatpak sandbox got escaped, pointing to a real advisory link. Then came the spicy meta-drama—croemer praised the explanation but jabbed that parts read “LLM-like,” and suddenly the thread was debating AI authorship as much as file handles. Skeptics like jshmrsn pressed the threat model: is this a true bug or just a way to escalate once an attacker already has a foothold? Meanwhile, practical minds asked if you can simply open the file with the caller’s rights and pass that handle along—yes, say the handle‑pilled crowd. Bonus twist: codethief warned that AI agents “sandboxed” by app code might fall for the same path tricks. The memes wrote themselves: open() and pray vs FD or GTFO.
Key Points
- •Path-based access across security boundaries is risky due to traversal, symlink, and TOCTOU vulnerabilities.
- •Normalizing and resolving symlinks works only if the unprivileged side cannot modify relevant filesystem paths concurrently.
- •TOCTOU races can let attackers replace validated directories with symlinks between check and use, redirecting access.
- •File descriptors (including O_PATH) provide stable references by pinning inodes and should be used instead of paths.
- •Converting file descriptors back to paths (e.g., for traditional mount APIs) reintroduces race conditions at resolution time.