May 14, 2026
Random drama isn’t actually random
Myths about /dev/urandom
That ‘safer’ random-number trick may be wasting everyone’s time
TLDR: The article says the commonly used random-number source is generally safe, while the supposedly stricter one often just blocks and causes pain. Commenters were split between debating real-world risk and roasting the article’s confusing structure, with one joke declaring “Deadpool is easier to follow.”
A classic nerd argument just got dragged back into the spotlight, and the crowd is very much making itself the main character. The article’s big claim is simple: the thing many people were taught to fear, /dev/urandom, is actually fine for security on Unix-like systems, while /dev/random has a nasty habit of freezing up and acting like it’s the responsible one at the party. In plain English: the author says the "slow and careful" option isn’t automatically safer, and the "normal" option isn’t secretly broken.
But honestly? The comments are where the fireworks are. One of the loudest reactions wasn’t even about the security debate — it was about the writing itself. Readers groaned that the article was so hard to follow they couldn’t always tell where one myth ended and the next correction began. One commenter absolutely torched it by saying “Deadpool is easier to follow,” which is the kind of review that deserves its own trophy.
Then came the practical crowd asking the question that always starts trouble: where are the real-world disasters? Aside from the infamous Debian key mess, commenters wanted receipts on whether bad random-number generation has actually caused major Linux break-ins. Others piled on with old Hacker News threads from 2014, 2018, and 2020, basically proving this fight is the tech version of a cursed family holiday argument that never, ever ends.
Key Points
- •The article states that /dev/urandom is the preferred source of cryptographic randomness on UNIX-like systems.
- •It says /dev/urandom and /dev/random use the same cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator.
- •The article argues that /dev/random is not inherently better for cryptography and identifies its blocking behavior as a major drawback.
- •It claims that concerns about /dev/urandom becoming insecure because entropy has 'run out' are misplaced, and says about 256 bits of entropy are sufficient for long-term computational security.
- •The article says the /dev/random and /dev/urandom man page recommends /dev/urandom for normal cryptographic use and does not actually contradict the article’s position.